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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KYLEE LETITIA JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48698-2021
Kootenai County Case No.
CR28-18-16603
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Johnson failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed a two-year probationary period following its revocation of her probation?
ARGUMENT
Johnson Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In October 2015, after a traffic stop in Shoshone County, 1 officers recovered

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in a vehicle in which Johnson had been a passenger,
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In October 2015, the district court granted Johnson’s motion to change the venue of her case to
Kootenai County. (R., pp.168-169.)
1

and additional paraphernalia in Johnson’s purse. (R., p.36.) At the time, Johnson displayed
signs of methamphetamine impairment. (Id.)
The state charged Johnson with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.54-56.) After a bench warrant was issued for an alleged violation of
Johnson’s pretrial release conditions (R., pp.58-65, 69), and pursuant to a plea agreement,
Johnson pled guilty to methamphetamine possession, and the state agreed to dismiss the
paraphernalia charge. (R., pp.73, 89-92). The district court withheld judgment and placed
Johnson on probation for two years. (R., pp.79-84.)
Over the next four-and-a-half years, Johnson entered a cycle of violating her probation,
participating in rider programming, and then being placed back on supervised probation.
Overall, the district court imposed a sentence of three years with one and one-half years
determinate and retained jurisdiction on three separate occasions (R., pp.132-133, 177-179, 239240), and placed Johnson on supervised probation at each corresponding rider review hearing
(R., pp.134-137, 184-185, 247-248). In general, Johnson did well during the periods of retained
jurisdiction, but continuously violated her probation.

Johnson admitted to violating her

probation in numerous respects, including: committing a new offense of inattentive driving,
failing urinalysis tests, failing to report to required drug testing, using alcohol and
methamphetamine, avoiding supervision, failing to report for a scheduled supervision
appointment, and twice getting removed from mental health court. (R., pp.97-99, 117-118, 141143, 151, 153-155, 175-176, 192-194, 200-202, 237-238.) After one of her probation violations,
Johnson also admitted to violating the terms of her pre-trial release by avoiding supervision and
by obtaining a new criminal charge of obstructing or delaying an officer. (R., pp.118, 125-126.)
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After the most recent period of retained jurisdiction, the parties both recommended that
Johnson be placed back on supervised probation. (1/28/21 Tr., p.16, L.22 – p.18, L.2.) Neither
party recommended that the probation be of any specific length. (See id.) The district court
suspended Johnson’s previously-imposed sentence and placed her on probation for two years.
(R., pp.247-248; 1/28/21 Tr., p.22, L.7 – p.23, L.10.) Johnson timely appealed. (R., pp.254257.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). A sentencing court has broad discretion with regard to
probation, including as to the length of the probation. State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 486,
959 P.2d 465, 467 (Ct. App. 1998).
The abuse of discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863,
421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
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appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Id. at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392
P.3d 1228, 1236-37 (2017) (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628
(2015)).
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or
action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error. State v.
Castrejon, 163 Idaho 19, 21, 407 P.3d 606, 608 (Ct. App. 2017) (citations omitted). This
doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during trial. Id. The purpose of the
invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in prompting a
trial court to take a certain action from later challenging that action on appeal. Id. at 22, 407
P.3d at 609 (citing State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999)).
As Johnson acknowledges on appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.1, 6), she requested, at the
third jurisdictional review hearing, for the district court to suspend her sentence and place her
back on supervised probation, and that she did not recommend any particular length of probation
(1/28/21 Tr., p.17, L.8 – p.18, L.2). The district court granted the request and placed Johnson on
supervised probation for two years. (1/28/21 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-10.) Although Johnson had the right
to refuse probation and instead serve his sentence, she did not object to any of the terms of her
probation, including its length (see generally 1/18/21 Tr.). State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843,
736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987) (“[I]f a defendant considers the conditions of probation too harsh, he
has the right to refuse probation and undergo the sentence.”). By accepting the conditions of her
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probation, Johnson consented to the probationary period of two years. Therefore, Johnson’s
claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error, and the
district court’s order placing Johnson on probation for two years should be affirmed.
Alternatively, the two-year probationary period imposed by the district court was entirely
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. On appeal, Johnson asserts that the two-year
period of probation was excessive due to her positive performance during the third period of
retained jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) However, it is clear from the sentencing
transcript that the district court was well aware of Johnson’s success with rider programming,
and considered this in making its sentencing determination. (See 1/28/21 Tr., p.19, Ls.21-22
(“Well, it’s an excellent report.”).) The court further noted that it does not “give up on people
very easily,” and was “overwhelmed,” and “try[ing] to keep from crying” after reading
Johnson’s letter submitted to it. (1/28/21 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-22; p.19, Ls.22-25; see
also PSI,
- --pp.179-182 (Johnson’s letter to the court).)
The district court was clearly vested in providing Johnson every opportunity to avoid a
prison sentence. The court took the unusual approach of retaining jurisdiction three separate
times after Johnson continuously violated the terms of her probation. (R., pp.132-133, 177-179,
239-240.)

On the third such occasion, the court retained jurisdiction despite the state’s

recommendation that it impose the underlying sentence instead. (6/18/20 Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8,
L.5; p.11, L.8 – p.12, L.18.) At the third rider review hearing, the court questioned Johnson at
some length about her plans upon her release to supervised probation, including where she was
going to live, why this living arrangement was advantageous for her, and who was picking her up
from the prison. (1/28/21 Tr., p.18, L.23 – p.22, L.6.) Attempting to provide Johnson with the
best opportunity for success on probation where she had previously been unsuccessful, the court
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additionally required that Johnson engage in weekly drug testing, complete community service,
attend a meeting each day for the first 90 days of probation, obtain a sponsor by a designated
date, and to get back into mental health treatment. (1/28/21 Tr., p.23, L.3 – p.25, L.9.) Finally,
the court also explained to Johnson that if she succeeded in the first year of the two-year
probation period, it would be “very happy to terminate that probation early,” and that it would
make the court “really happy to be able to do that.” (1/28/21 Tr., p.23, Ls.11-13.)
In light of the rehabilitative-based approach to its sentencing determinations, even in light
of Johnson’s continuous failures to comply with the terms of supervised probation, it was
entirely reasonable for the district court to an impose a two-year probationary term, especially
considering that Johnson requested no other particular timeframe. Johnson has therefore failed
to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. This Court should affirm
the judgment of conviction.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentencing determination of the
district court.
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of October, 2021, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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/s/ Mark W. Olson
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Deputy Attorney General
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